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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS NOT A COMMON LAW ACTION 
Unlawful Detainer is a Statutory Action and therefore in 
bringing it, reference must be made to the statutory 
authorization or the action becomes a Common Law Writ of 
Ejectment. No reference was made to statutory authorization. If 
the action is found to be Unlawful Detainer, Plaintiff requested 
other equitable reliefs beside restitution of the property, 
thereby affecting the characterization as strictly Statutory 
Unlawful Detainer Action with its ten day Appeal period, and 
converting it into an equitable action with its thirty day 
Appeal Period. 
POINT II. ALL INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE APPEAL WAS BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The fact of the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Action was presented 
to the Court by Ford's attorney in great detail. The failure of 
Salazar to emphasize the Bankruptcy stay does not preclude the 
Appeal Court from ruling upon its effect, since all information 
was before the lower court, and Defendants claimed their Appeal 
was timely. 
POINT III. BASED UPON FORD'S OWN INFORMATION SALAZAR'S APPEAL 
WAS TIMELY. 
Under the events as described by Ford, the Appeal was timely 
filed and Salazar perfected his Appeal as soon as possible after 
the Stay was lifted. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS NOT A COMMON LAW ACTION. 
Ford claims that the action was clearly one based upon Unlawful 
Detainer as defined in U.C.A. §78-36-3, but cannot show any place 
in his Complaint that describes it as such, or refers to the code 
section under which it is brought, or to Unlawful Detainer. 
Under common law, there was no action of Unlawful Detainer. 
If it were your property you could take it back, so long as your 
methods were not exceptionally violent, (22 Am Jur 907). The 
general purpose for the Statutory Unlawful Detainer was to 
provide a peaceable method of returning property over to the true 
owner. " The general purpose of the statues of forcible entry and 
detainer, xxx...xxx in this country, is that regardless of the 
actual condition of the title to, or the right of possession of, 
the property, the party actually in peaceable and quiet 
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or 
terror." emphasis added, (22 Am Jur 909) 
To sustain an action in forcible entry or detainer in 
absence of statutory modification, " the plaintiffs possession 
and the forcible entry or detainer are ordinarily the sole 
questions at issue. To sustain these proceedings it is necessary 
to prove only that the complainant was in actual and peaceable 
possession of the premises, and that the defendant forcibly 
entered and turned him out or deposed him by force after a 
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peaceable entry." 22 Am Jur 910, see Scott v. Hewitt 127 Tex 31 
90 S.W. 2d 816 
Under Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah# Inc., 558 P.2d 
1317 (Ut. 1976), the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's 
failure to strictly comply with the provisions of section 78-36-8 
converted his action for unlawful detainer into one at common law 
for ejectment. In the first count, Plaintiff sought to recover 
possession of real estate, and in the second count sought to 
quiet title to certain land adjoining the property involved in 
first cause of action. Therefore, the case was tried as an 
action in equity and Plaintiff could not defeat the Appeal by 
contending that the action was one of forcible detainer. See 
also, Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co. 56 Utah 190, 188 
P. 1117 (1920) 
In the action at hand, Plaintiffs are not dealing with a 
buyer of property. They are dealing with a party who claims 
title through a trust deed as Trustors of the Deed. In this 
situation, Ford has never been in possession of the land, neither 
actual nor contractual. 
While true, that Ford claimed an interest in the property in 
its complaint, that interest was denied in Salazar's Answer, 
therefore placing the burden of proving title on the Plaintiff, 
and the Court in the position of having to determine title to the 
real property which under §78-4-7 (1) (a) U.C.A., " The Circuit 
Court shall have civil jurisdiction both law and equity xxx, 
except: (a) in actions to determine the title to real property". 
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The Circuit Court did not have the jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of the title. The Court proceeded, over the objection 
of the Defendants, to hear evidence on who held title and 
evidence on Defendant's proffering and acceptance of partial 
payment by Ford prior to the Trustee Sale. The Court 
subsequently found that it did not believe Defendant Salazar's 
testimony, and found for the Plaintiffs, and by so doing exceeded 
its jurisdictional limits by determining where the title lay. 
The statutory requirement of §78-36-2, UCA that the Court 
found the tenant, by force, unlawfully held and kept possession 
was neither alleged to in Plaintiff's Complaint nor found by the 
Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or its 
Judgment, and therefore we have what is an action in Common Law 
Ejectment, or Common Law Restitution. 
Under §78-36-8, "The Plaintiff in his Complaint in addition 
to setting forth the facts upon on which he seeks to recover, may 
set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which 
may have accompanied the Unlawful Detainer, and claim 
damages therefore or compensation for the occupation of the 
premises or both." 
Plaintiff failed to claim Unlawful Detainer in his Complaint 
and failed to allege the points contained in § 78-36-2(1) which 
define Unlawful Detainer. Furthermore the Court failed to find 
any acts that made up Unlawful Detainer. As we speak of Unlawful 
Detainer, Common Law Ejectment or Restitution it is important for 
all parties to know which procedure they are dealing with. If an 
4 
action in Unlawful Detainer, there is a ten day Appeal period. 
If an action in Unlawful Detainer and Equity, or an action in 
Ejectment, Restitution or Equity there is a thirty day Appeal 
period. 
Plaintiffs brought an action claiming title and designating 
how it received title to the property in question. It further 
claimed that Defendants refused to leave the premises upon 
notice. Plaintiffs went on to claim that they had a prospective 
buyer for the property and might be damaged by Defendants' past 
and future interference with the sale. The Plaintiffs then held 
to themselves the right to amend the complaint if necessary if 
they had a loss from the perceived interference. Under the 
Prayer, Plaintiffs requested such other relief as the Court 
deemed proper thereby leaving room for damages caused by the lost 
sale due to Defendants acts if so adjudged. By so doing, if it 
were not already an action in ejectment, it became an action in 
equity by so broadening the requests, i.e. requesting (1) Writ of 
Restitution, (2) damages for staying in the property, after 
notice and (3) potential damages for loss of sell . 
This action in reality was or became an action for 
ejectment, i.e., to eject the Defendants from their property. It 
was based upon the fact that Plaintiff claimed its title to be 
superior to Defendants; and that its trustee sale was properly 
held, and that the loan was in default. 
Defendants denied Plaintiff's claims of title to the 
property in its Complaint, It denied that the Trustee Sale was 
5 
valid and that the loan was in default. It laid claim to the 
fact that fraud was perpetuated upon it by the Plaintiff and 
therefore the Plaintiff had no right for the Prayers in his 
action. It further demanded that Plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed. 
At trial Defendants moved the Court for a dismissal or 
removal to the District Court based upon the fact that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to try an action to determine title to real 
property. 
The Court found under its Findings of Fact that the 
Defendants claims in equity were not sufficient but made no 
determination as to the points that make up Unlawful Detainer. 
Unlawful Detainer was neither alleged or proved. Therefore, this 
action comes under the thirty day Appeal period. 
POINT II: SALAZAR DID NOT WAIVE CLAIMS OF TOLLING BY FAILURE TO 
ARGUE THAT MATTER BEFORE THE LOWER COURT, 
Plaintiffs claimed the ten day period had passed before the 
appeal was filed. Defendants argued that it had not passed. The 
Court, along with both Defendants and Plaintiff's counsel 
struggled with the proper deadline for the Appeal to be filed. 
The issue before the Court was whether the Appeal was timely 
after the Court had ruled it did not have jurisdiction, 
Plaintiff's counsel described to the Court the difficulty it had 
in evicting Defendants. He discussed the fact of the Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy and how he had to have the Stay lifted on an Ex Parte 
basis. The completed sequence of the timing was before the 
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Court. The Court could have changed its jurisdictional position 
if it had desired so to do, but did not. All facts were before 
the Court. 
The clear facts of the case are that Defendants could not 
have filed the Appeal sooner without being in contempt of the 
Bankruptcy Court. Defendants received notice that the Stay had 
been lifted at 7:00 p.m. on May 25, 1990 and on the next day, 
their Appeal was filed. Plaintiff in his brief has designated 
May 21'st as the proper date by which the Appeal was to be filed, 
but for on that date, the Bankruptcy stayed the tolling of Appeal 
time. After the release of Stay was filed with the Circuit 
Court, Defendants perfected their Appeal on the very same day. 
It could not have been filed any sooner after the Bankruptcy was 
filed and the Stay released and therefore it was timely. The 
lower Court did have jurisdiction for processing the Appeal and 
should have allowed the record to be transferred to the proper 
Appeal Court. 
The cases presented by Plaintiffs relative to whether the 
Court had all the information before it are not in point. In the 
jury selection case (Salt Lake County vs. Carlston), 776 P.2d 653 
(Ut. App. 1989) no objection had been raised as to the method of 
jury selection at the time of trial, the issue on Appeal was not 
before the Court. In the case at hand, Defendants claimed the 
Appeal was timely filed, and argued that issue. The Court had 
all the evidence before it on the issue of the Bankruptcy staying 
the tolling of the Appeal time, but chose to continue with its 
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Judgment that the Appeal was not filed timely. 
In the other cases, presented by Plaintiffs all are based 
upon issues not raised at trial, i.e. hearsay objection not being 
made, issue of contract amendment, issue of jury selection, 
objection pertaining to the issue of failure to make a requested 
voir dire inquiry, all of which are matters not before this 
Court. 
Once again the issue of timeliness was before the Court. 
All the evidence was before the Court as to when filed, the 
Bankruptcy filing, etc., but the Court still chose to continue 
with it lack of jurisdiction based upon its decision that the 
filing was untimely. Logically, if Plaintiff's position were to 
be held, only cases given at trial could be used on Appeal- which 
of course is not the case. 
POINT III. THE APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN THE TEN DAY PERIOD 
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW. 
On September 7, 1990, Plaintiffs mailed proposed copy of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment to 
Defendants7 attorney. On or about September 10, 1990, the 
Judgment was signed, several days earlier than it should have 
been - Rule 4-504(2) states that opposing counsel has 5 days 
after service to object to form and contents. Copies of the 
signed Judgment and Findings were mailed to Defendants on 
September 11, 1990. The Plaintiff's attorney signed a Notice of 
Entry of Judgment on September 13, 1991. Defendants filed 
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bankruptcy on September 21, 1990, The Stay was released on 
September 25, and served on Defendants at their home on September 
25, at 7:00 p.m. The release of the Automatic Stay was filed 
with the Circuit Court on September 26, 1990. The Appeal was 
filed on September 26, 1990, during the day. 
According to U.R.C.P., Rule 6(e), "Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings 
within a prescribed period of after the service of notice or 
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him 
by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period." 
Under Rule 58(d) U.R.C.P., "The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of Judgment to all 
other parties and shall file proof of service of such notice with 
the Clerk of the Court" . This notice was signed on the 13th of 
September, 1990 and mailed to Defendants, presumably on the 13th. 
Adding the three days onto the 13th would make the Appeal due on 
the 2 6th day of September, 1990, the day it was filed. 
Even if the three day mailing is not allowed, with the 
tolling of the time caused by the filing of the Bankruptcy, the 
filing was still timely if the Court should find this was an 
Unlawful Detainer Action. Equity and justice dictates that the 
Appeal was timely. 
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CONCLUSION 
Clearly under several theories the Appeal was filed timely. 
(1) This was not an Unlawful Detainer Action but an Action 
brought in Equity. Since Unlawful Detainer is a statutory act, 
to claim under it at least some reference must be made to it and 
if title must be proved and other damages are to be determined, 
then it becomes an action in ejectment or equity, and therefore a 
thirty day Appeal period. 
(2) All facts were before the Court as to the staying of 
the tolling of the Appeal time by the Bankruptcy filing. The 
Court failed to apply the law properly and so, was incorrect in 
finding the Appeal was filed untimely. 
(3) The Plaintiff was careless in perfecting his Judgment. 
The signed Judgment, etc., papers were not mailed until September 
11, 1990. The Notice of judgment was not signed until September 
13, 1990 and mailed probably on the same day. Adding on the 
three days for receiving mail to the ten days would still make 
the filing date the 26'th of September, 1990 and this does not 
include the Stay of the tolling produced by the filing of the 
Bankruptcy Action. Therefore under this argument the Appeal was 
timely. 
WHEREFORE the Appeal Court should overrule the lower courts 
dismissal and allow the Appeal to be transferred to the proper 
Appeals Court for a hearing on the merit of the original Appeal. 
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78-4-7 JUDICIAL CODE 
(b) If a governing body establishes a circuit court or returns to a justice 
of the peace system, it shall cause the Office of the State Court Adminis-
trator to be notified in writing within 30 days after the fact. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-6, enacted by L. 
1977, ch . 77, § 1; 1987, ch. 228, § 3. 
Repea l s and Enac tmen t s . — Laws 1977, 
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-6 (L. 1951, 
ch. 26, § 2(3); C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-3.12), re-
pealing and separability clause, and enacted 
present § 78-4-6, effective July 1, 1978. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 14, divided the former sec-
tion into Subsections (l)(a), (1Kb), and (2); sub-
stituted "is created" for "will be created and 
deemed to exist on the effective date of this 
act" in the first sentence of Subsection (l)(a); 
deleted "shall" preceding "succeed" and "office 
o f preceding "city judge" and substituted 
"have" for "shall exercise" in the second sen-
tence of Subsection (l)(a); substituted "is 
known" for "shall be known" in the second sen-
tence of Subsection (1Kb); added Subsection 
(l)(c); divided the former first sentence of Sub-
section (2) into the present first and second 
sentences by deleting "and"; substituted "a 
municipal judge of the peace may not" for "no 
justice of the peace shall" in the present first 
sentence of Subsection (2); substituted "are 
successors" for "shall be the successors" and 
"the" for "such" preceding "municipal depart-
ments" in the present second sentence of Sub-
section (2); and substituted "the" for "such" 
preceding "election" and inserted "municipal" 
preceding "justice" in the present third sen-
tence of Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 228, des-
ignated the previously undesignated provi-
sions of this section as last amended by Laws 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; added present Subsection 
(2)(b); and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Justices' courts, 
Chapter 5 of this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Successors to jus t ices of peace . office of justice of the peace. What was 
. . tended was to annex the duties of justice 
m-
—City judges . 
The Legislature, by providing that city 
judges shall be ex officio justices of the peace, 
did not intend that city judges should hold the 
j stices of 
the peace to the office of the city judge. City of 
Ogden City v. Patterson, 122 Utah 389, 250 
P.2d 570 (1952)(decided under prior law). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 291. 
Key Numbers . — Courts <s= 187. 
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions — Concurrent ju-
risdiction. 
(1) The circuit court shall have civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all 
matters if the sum claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of court costs, 
except: 
(a) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics liens; 
(b) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(c) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(d) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(e) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; 
(f) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
(2) The circuit 
jeace courts wh 
History: C. 1953 
L977, ch. 77, § 1; L 
;h. 121, § 1. 
Repeals and Em 
:h. 77, § 1 repealed 
•h. 58, § 1; C. 1943, i 
:ity court judges as s 
seace, ana4 enacted j 
July 1, 1978. 
Amendment Not 
ment rewrote Subse 
The 1986 amendm 
ing actions to foreclo 
A: 
Amount in controve 
—Counterclaim. 
City court. 
District court. 
—Sum claimed. 
City court. 
District court. 
Extraterritorial juri; 
—Property in anoth 
False imprisonment 
Title to real estate. 
—Recovery of purer; 
Waters and water i 
—Upkeep of irrigat 
Amount in con t ro 
—Counterclaim. 
City cour t . 
City court was wi 
terclaim which ex 
limit; consent or sti] 
alter that rule; coun 
dismissed on demun 
Utah 255, 264 P. 9 
• Distr ict cour t . 
District court hel< 
jurisdiction on appe 
amended counterclai 
by it, and rendering 
in excess of amount 
diction to try and d< 
had jurisdiction of s 
time it was comme 
trial without objecti 
Marks, 53 Utah 77 
i Where action was 
of Ogden for less th 
negligence for dam 
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Rule 6 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made sifter the expiration of th? 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served a t some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 6, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision 
(b), was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of 
the Appellate Procedure. 
Cross-References. — Amendment to plead-
ings to conform to evidence, time of motion for, 
Rule 15(b). 
Commencement of action, time of service, 
Rule 4(b). 
Corporation or association, mailing of pro-
cess to, Rule 4(e)(5). 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu-
larities, Rule 32(d). 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop-
erty, Rule 64C(f). 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3. 
Election laws, Sundays included in computa-
tion of time, § 20-1-12. 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge, 
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21. 
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13. 
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*E UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58A 
ikview Apts. ex rel. Hedman 
e Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693 
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is v. Utah Power and Light 
(Utah 1989); Bergen v. Trav-
76 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 
\ Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, 
3 (Utah 1989); Bailey v. Par-
5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Utah 
Office v. Salt Lake County, 
ah 1989); Donahue v. Durfee, 
ah Ct. App. 1989); Territorial 
I v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah 
r. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Id 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Chapman v. Primary Chil-
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989); Yoho 
v. Shillington, 784 P.2d 1253 
>89); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 
Butterfield ex rel. Butterfield 
2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
tcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. 
ge Inn Apts. v. State Farm 
790 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 
United Television, Inc., 797 
L990); Alford v. Utah League 
, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 
Copier Painting v. Van 
!d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
tute, use of evidence exclud-
;at or support summary judg-
d 970. 
; for interference with physi-
relationship with hospital, 7 
'oral testimony at state sum-
earing, 53 A.L.R.4th 527. 
vidence to support grant of 
it in will probate or contest 
L.L.R.4th 561. 
iring and oral arguments on 
ry judgment or for judgment 
in federal courts, 1 A.L.R. 
— Judgment <*=» 178 to 190. 
pursuant to Chapter 33 
ese rules, and the right 
ices and in the manner 
adequate remedy does 
vhere it is appropriate. 
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 57, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
146. 
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment *» 
41, 42, 251, 367. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declara-
tory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments 
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155. 
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment; The prevailingjMj£t£jhall 
promrjt^^ J E $ 3 g ^ r ^ 
and"shal]UBie proof or service"ofsxicli notice witn ftieTclerk of the court How' 
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
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